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Abstract. In this paper we propose a trust-aware enhancement of RBAC
(TA-RBAC) that takes trustworthiness of users into consideration explic-
itly before granting access. We assume that each role in the framework is
associated with an expression that describe trustworthiness of subjects re-
quired to be able to activate the role, and each subject (user) has assigned
trustworthiness level in the system. By adding trustworthiness constraints
to roles we enhance system, for example, with more flexible ability to del-
egate roles, to control reading/updating of objects by denying such oper-
ations to those subjects that violate trustworthiness requirements.
1 Introduction
Over the years, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) has established itself as a
generalized approach for handling access control in computer systems and diﬀers
from traditional identity based access control models in that it takes advantage
of the concept of role relations [11, 10]. For these models, access to data and
resources are based on the organizational activities and responsibilities, or roles,
which users possess in a system. In RBAC, a user’s ability to access computer
resources (objects) is determined by the user’s association with roles and by these
roles’ permissions to perform operations on objects. Usually roles correspond to
diﬀerent job functions within an organization. Job functions are associated sets
of permissions, which can be seen as expression of trustworthiness of role holder
within an organization.
Diﬀerent access control models to support various organizational security poli-
cies have been proposed over the years. The ﬁrst model that supported integrity
protection of resources was Biba Model developed by Kenneth J. Biba in 1977
[5]. This model describes a set of access control rules designed to ensure data
integrity. The idea is that subjects on lower integrity levels are not permitted
to modify (corrupt) objects on higher integrity levels (known as ”no write up”
rule). Correspondently, subjects on higher integrity levels can be corrupted by
accessing objects on lower integrity levels (known as ”no read down” rule). This
model can be considered as one of the ﬁrst models dealing with trustworthi-
ness (also implicitly). According to [6], ”integrity refers to the trustworthiness
of data or resources, and it is usually phrased in terms of preventing improper
or unauthorized change”.
Bell-LaPadula model was proposed to support protection of conﬁdentiality
[3]. This model describes access rules to protect conﬁdentiality of resources.
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Assuming that subjects are assigned clearance levels and objects are assigned
classiﬁcation levels the model’s rule support no write down and no read up rules.
However these rules also prevent eﬀective communication.
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) Model has been found to be quite useful
and has drawn a lot of research interest over the last ﬁfteen years. It was recently
deﬁned as NIST/ANSI Standard [2]. Traditional RBAC considers user to role as
well as role to permission assignments to be static in nature with respect to space
and time. However it was observed that the context-aware access should play a
more active role in access decision process. For example, in mobile applications,
spatial context plays an increasingly important role both in deﬁning and en-
forcing more elaborated security policies since in many applications locations of
participants should directly inﬂuence access control decisions [1, 7, 9, 17–19, 22].
In recent years some new extensions of RBAC that use notion of trust have
being proposed [4, 8, 24, 25]. Trust-aware access control models are more suitable
for decentralized, multi-centric systems with dynamic population of users where
traditional access models do not work well. One of the beneﬁt of trust awareness
(not considered yet in existing extensions of RBAC) is an ability to provide
history-based solutions.
In this paper we propose to enhance the discrete trust paradigm with more
elaborated multi-level trust paradigm based on notion of opinion from subjective
logic. In this new trust-enhanced model, trust levels of subjects (human users
or software agents acting on users behalf), roles and objects (data, programs,
processes) are expressed as opinions about their trustworthiness determined by
history of interactions between subjects (users) and objects. We deﬁne such
opinions in the framework of subjective logic [14, 15].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide brief
review of related work. We introduce notation and notions of subjective logic
in Section 3. Then we present our trust-enhanced RBAC model in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Recent years many context-aware extensions of RBAC were proposed. Most of
them considered speciﬁcally access wth respect of time and location.
In [17, 18], authors extend the RBAC model by specifying spatial restric-
tions on permissions assigned to roles which enables a role to have permissions
assigned to it dependent on the location. Spatial constraints on permissions as-
signed to a role can be beneﬁcial when specifying the access control policy in
mobile environments where the location from which a user wnats to access ser-
vices is a key security parameter [19]. Authors have extended the RBAC model,
and introduced a formal model that allows specifying spatial constraints on per-
missions associated with roles in diﬀerent locations. In [9] authors propose a
spatially-aware RBAC model called GEO-RBAC. In the proposed approach au-
thors propose the notion of spatial roles which are deﬁned as roles with spatial
extents deﬁning the boundaries of the space in which the role can be used by the
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users. In this approach roles are activated based on the position of the user. An-
other location aware RBAC model has been proposed in [22]. Authors show how
the diﬀerent components of the core RBAC model are related to location, how
existing operations need to be modiﬁed and what new operations are needed.
They left elaboration of role hierarchies and separation of duty constraints for fu-
ture work. Several authors have also proposed models that combine both spatial
and temporal aspects [7, 1].
However, relatively recently some authors started to consider trust as a new
context parameter. This is motivated by desire to expand RBAC models to meet
security challenges posed by new application paradigms were existing models
found to be inadequate (for example, for open and decentralized systems or
mobile and pervasive systems). In [4] authors motivation was to provide ac-
cess control model for Web services. They propose an extended, trust-enhanced
version of XML-based RBAC (X-RBAC) framework that incorporates context-
based access control. In the framework, the authors rely on certiﬁcation provided
by trusted third party assigning levels of trust to users. In [8] authors propose
a trust based access control model called TrustBAC by extending the conven-
tional RBAC model with the notion of trust levels. Users are assigned to trust
levels instead of roles based on a number of factors like user credentials, user
behavior history, user recommendation etc. Trust levels are numbers between
−1 and +1 and which computes by the trust evaluation module. In [24] authors
propose a trust-based RBAC model for pervasive computing systems where they
adapt trust model they proposed earlier [23] to evaluate trustworthiness. Needs
for delegation arise in many applications. Trustworthy delegation that does not
violate security policies by allowing access only to trustworthy delegatee was
considered in [25]. In [20] authors propose a framework that combines strenths
of RBAC systhems and trust-management systems to deal with access control in
decenralized collabarative systems. The trustworthness of subjects is determined
on the base of their certiﬁed attributes.
3 Measurement of Trust: Subjective Logic
In this section, we show how to express the levels of trustworthiness in the
framework of subjective logic. Following [14, 15] we ﬁrst deﬁne the term opinion,
denoted ω, that expresses opinion about level of trustworthiness.
Let t, d and u be such that t + d + u = 1 and t, d, u ∈ [0, 1]. Then a triple
ω = {t, d, u} is called an opinion, where components t, d and u represent levels
of trust, distrust and uncertainty respectively. The levels of trustworthiness are
expressed by opinions. Varying these parameters, we can express diﬀerent levels
of trustworthiness. Expressing trustworthiness using three values instead of just
one trust level provides a more adequate trust model of real world with uncer-
tainties. These parameters are not treated equally when diﬀerent opinions are
combined.
The subjective logic deﬁnes a set of logical operators for combining opinions
including conjunction, recommendation, and consensus. For more details related
to subjective logic the reader is recommended to consult [14–16].
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Let ωA =
{
tA, dA, uA
}
denote an opinion about trustworthiness of entity A.
Let ωAp =
{
tAp , d
A
p , u
A
p
}
denote an opinion of entity A about consequences for
security of an action p. In context of this paper, A can be an RBAC system itself
or a user, and an action p may be ”activate role r”. Assume that an entity A
has an opinion ωAp =
{
tAp , d
A
p , u
A
p
}
about potential security threat of p, and an
opinion ωAq =
{
tAq , d
A
q , u
A
q
}
about potential security threat q. Then A’s opinion
about consequences for security of both actions, denoted as p∧ q , can be found
(according to [14]) as following:
ωAp∧q = ω
A
p ∧ ωAq =
{
tAp∧q, d
A
p∧q, u
A
p∧q
}
where
tAp∧q = t
A
p t
A
q
dAp∧q = d
A
p + d
A
q − dAp dAq
uAp∧q = t
A
p u
A
q + u
A
p t
A
q + u
A
p u
A
q
Let A and B be two entities (RBAC systems or users). If A is a RBAC system
itself, it has opinions about trustworthiness of its own users but not about users
in other RBAC systems (in a federated system). Then ωAB =
{
tAB, d
A
B , u
A
B
}
de-
notes an opinion of A entity about trustworthiness of recommendations given
by B. Assume B gives its recommendation to A about trustworthiness of action
p in the form of its opinion ωBp . Assuming that an entity A does not have any
direct opinion ωAp about p it will try to deduce some indirect opinion about trust-
worthiness of p, denoted ωABp , based on recommendation given by B. For this
purpose the recommendation operator ⊗ is used (according to [14]) as follows:
ωABp = ω
A
B ⊗ ωBp =
{
tABp , d
AB
p , u
AB
p
}
where
tABp = t
A
Bt
B
p
dABp = t
A
Bd
B
p
uABp = d
A
B + u
A
B + t
A
Bu
B
p
In context of this work there is a need to combine independent opinions about
trustworthiness of the same action. According to [16], ”The consensus opinion
of two possibly conﬂicting argument opinions is an opinion that reﬂects both
argument opinions in a fair and equal way”. Adjusting reasoning from [16] we
can argue applicability of the consensus operator (deﬁned below).
Let A and B be two entities that represent entities such as the system or
users. Let ωA = {tA, dA, uA} and ωB = {tB, dB, uB} be two opinions of A
and B about the same action (object, user). In the case when there are several
independent opinions about the same action, subjective logic suggests to use
a consensus operator ⊕ to combine these independent opinions. According to
subjective logic, the combined consensus opinion ω based on ωA and ωB is
deﬁned as follows:
ω = ωA ⊕ ωB
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where
t = (tAuB + tBuA)/(uA + uB − uAuB)
d =
(
dAuB + dBuA
)
/
(
uA + uB − uAuB) r
u =
(
uAuB
)
/
(
uA + uB − uAuB)
We deﬁne odering relation on opinions in the following way. We assume that
opinion ωA is more trustworthy than opinion ωB, denoted ωA  ωB, if tA > tB.
If tA = tB, then higher distrust value means lower corresponding uncertainty
value. Assuming that decreasing uncertainty may contribute equally to both
trust and distrust values, we choose opinions with higher uncertainty (and with
equal trust values tA and tB ) be more trustworthy. Formally, if tA = tB then
ωA  ωB if uA > uB .
In the following section we describe how trustworthiness expressed as opinions
can be integrated into traditional RBAC model.
4 Trust-Aware RBAC (TA-RBAC)
Informally, we assume that there is a set of roles ROLES that may be assigned
to users from USERS. Each user u may have many roles assigned at the same
time. Each role r from ROLES is associated with a pair {ωl, ωh}. It means that
trustworthiness of a user u who are able to activate r cannot be lower than ωl
and higher than ωh respectively.
In this section we propose a trust-aware RBAC (TA-RBAC) model that is
an extension of traditional RBAC model [2]. Since the time of introduction of
RBAC, various context-aware models were proposed (see Section 2). However
some important features dictated by current and future real-world applications
such as, for example, handling access request in proximity of speciﬁc devices [21]
or taking history of behavior or actions are still not well-developed. This is the
motivation behind the proposed extension.
Informally, in the proposed extension of RBAC each role r from ROLES
has assigned requirements on trustworthiness of users u from USERS that are
permitted to activate this role. It means that to have role assigned to u is not
enough - it is also necessary verify that the current level of trustworthiness of u
satisﬁes trustworthiness requirements assigned to the role r. This is an additional
constraint (requirement) that may be used to take into account behavior history
of u such as what roles u has activated in the past, for which purposes, from
which location, when, etc. Dynamically changing trustworthiness constraints of
roles provides additional constraints on ability of u to activate assigned roles,
for example, in case of trust-aware separation of duties (explained in Subsection
4.3).
The proposed TA-RBAC model consists of the following ﬁve basic compo-
nents: USERS, ROLES, PRMS, SESSIONS and TRW representing the set
of users, roles, permissions, sessions and opinions respectively, where TRW is
a set of possible opinions about trustworthiness of users and roles. Users from
USERS are considered to be either humans, devices or processes operating on
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behalf of other users that can access resources (services) to perform some actions.
ROLES describes a collection of roles deﬁned as a set of permissions that may
be guarded by trustworthiness constraints to control accessibility to resources
(objects). PRMS is a set of permissions to access resources/services to per-
form a speciﬁc action if trustworthiness of the user satisﬁes trust requirements.
Elements of TRW is speciﬁed by means of subjective logic opinions.
4.1 Core Model
The model deﬁnes several functions and relations on the sets USERS, ROLES,
PRMS, SESSIONS, TRI needed for speciﬁcation and implementation of TA-
RBAC. The user assignment relation UA represents the assignment of a user
from USERS to roles from ROLES. The permission assignment relation PA
represents the assignment of permissions to roles based on trustworthiness of
both users and services. Deﬁnition below gives formal descriptions of some im-
portant functions and relations.
Definition 1. TA-RBAC core model consists of the following components:
– USERS, ROLES, PRMS, SESSIONS and TRW , represent the finite
sets of users, roles, permissions, sessions, and opinions respectively;
– PRMS = REQUESTS × SERV ICES where REQUESTS denotes all
action requests users can send to services denoted as SERV ICES;
– TRW represents trustworthiness in form of subjective logic opinions (in-
cluding complete trust (1, 0, 0), complete distrust (0, 1, 0) and complete un-
certainty (0, 0, 1));
– UA ⊆ USERS ×ROLES , the relation that associates users with roles;
– TRI ⊆ TRW × TRW represents the set of trustworthiness intervals, where
(ω1, ω2) ∈ TRI means ω1  ω2 or ω1 = ω2;
– UT ⊆ USERS×TRW defines assignment of trustworthiness level to users;
– assigned trust (u : USERS) → TRW , the function mapping a user u into
an opinion. Formally, trustworthiness of user u can be found as
assigned trust (u) = {ω|(u, ω) ∈ UT };
– RT ⊆ ROLES × TRI defines assignment of trustworthiness level to roles;
– role trust constr(r : ROLES) → TRI, the function that maps a role r
to trustworthiness interval from TRI. Formally, trustworthiness constraints
associated with r can be found as role trust constr(r) = {t|(r, t) ∈ RT }.
– assigned users(r : ROLES) → 2USERS , the mapping of a role onto a set of
users. Formally, users assigned to role r can be found as assigned users(r) =
{u ∈ USERS|(u, r) ∈ UA} ;
– assigned roles(u : USERS) → 2ROLES , the mapping of a user u onto a set of
roles. Formally, roles assigned to a user u can be found as assigned roles(u) =
{r ∈ ROLES|(u, r) ∈ UA};
– PA ⊆ ROLES×PRMS , the relation that defines what permissions PRMS
of a role r from ROLES are available to a user with trustworthiness level
suitable to activate r. That is (r, p) ∈ PA means that if user u has assigned
role r she can utilize permission p = (req, srv) to access service srv when
trustworthiness of u satisfies trust requirement of r.
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– assigned perms(r : ROLES, t : TRW ) → 2PRMS describes permissions
assigned to role r when trustworthiness of a user u activating r satisfies
trust requirements of r. Formally, assigned perms(r) = {p|(r, p) ∈ PA};
– user sessions(u : USERS) → 2SESSIONS, associate a user u with set of
sessions;
– session roles(s : SESSIONS) → 2ROLES, the mapping of session s to a
set of roles;
– avail session perms(s : SESSIONS, t : TRI) → 2PRMS , the permissions
available in a session s when trust requirements satisfies t.
Formally, avail session perms(s, t) =
⋃
r∈session roles(s)
assigned perms(r, t)
– auth user(r : ROLES, t : TRI) → USERS identifies users assigned to role
r satisfying t.
– auth user(r1, r2, .... : ROLES) → USERS identifies users assigned to at
least roles r1, r2, ..., rk;
– auth user(s : SESSIONS; r1, r2, .... : ROLES) → USERS identifies users
that are authorized to activate simultaneously roles r1, r2, ...rk within a ses-
sion s.
We assume that each user u assigned an initial trust level, init trust : USERS →
TRW , and each role r from ROLES has assigned trustworthiness constraints as[
ωl, ωh
]
from TRI where ωl denotes the lowest trust level that a user umust have
to be able activate r; ωh denotes a trustworthiness level that user activating r
must not exceed (in cases when it is not essential ωh = (1, 0, 0), meaning highest
possible trustworthiness).
4.2 Role Hierarchies
In order to extend the core TA-RBAC to Hierarchical TA-RBAC we need to de-
ﬁne hierarchies and inheritance for roles in presence of trust describing how roles
inherit permissions from their junior roles. Deﬁnition below formally introduces
our solution.
Definition 2. Relation RH, defines as RH ⊆ ROLES ×ROLES, is a partial
order on roles, with respect to trustworthiness, called dominance relation, denoted
as 	 , where ri 	 rj for ri, rj ∈ ROLES means that ri inherits permissions of rj.
Let role trust constr(rj) = (ω
l
j , ω
h
j ) and role trust constr(ri) = (ω
l
i, ω
h
i ) . We
saying that role ri inherits permissions of role rj with trustworthiness constraints
for user assigned to ri computed as following: (ω
l
j ⊕ ωli, ωrj ⊕ ωri ).
The use of the consensus operator can be argued that trustworthiness constraints
(ωli, ω
h
i ) and (ω
l
j , ω
h
j ) can be seen as independent opinions on trustworthiness
constraints of rj .
The reason for use of the consensus operator is as following. There are two
independent sets of trustworthiness constraints of ri: 1) the trusworthiness con-
straints on ri independant of hierarchies, and 2) trustworthiness constraints
derived from constraints of the inherited role rj . In case of two independent
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opinions the consensus operator usually applied to ﬁnd a combined opnions that
constitutes the new constraints. The user assigned to ri have to satisfy native
constraints of ri to use its permissions. However when the user wants to use
inherited permissions of rj , she must satisfy constraints that are consensus be-
tween constraints of ri and rj . A user assigned directly to rj have to satisfy
native constraints of rj in order to activate its permissions.
4.3 Separation of Duties
The eﬃciency of RBAC to enforce the principle of least privilege is partly due to
ability to enforce Separation of Duties (SoD) principle. However by constraining
ability of users to activate some combination of roles reduce system’s usability,
for example, in small organizations where number of users are small with respect
to number of roles.
The trust-awareness may provide better ﬂexibility by for example putting less
constraints on highly trustful users. However, that means that the notion of SoD
needs to be re-deﬁned. We deﬁnes both Trust-aware Static SoD (TSSoD) and
Trust-aware Dynamic SoD (TDSoD), where requirement to trustworthiness of a
user who activates (partly) mutually exclusive roles increases. That is, two roles
with assigned permissions may be partly mutually exclusive if system requires
higher level of trustworthiness comparing to requirements when only each role
will be activated separately.
We deﬁne trust-aware separation of duty SoD property as following set. Let
S = {(r, ω), ...} where r ∈ ROLES, ω ∈ TRW and ω informally represents
opinion of the RBAC system on how security sensitive activation of r is. When a
user u activates a set of roles r1, r2, ..., rk such that from {(ri, ωi)|i = 1, ..., k} ⊆
S the requirements to trustworthiness of the user will be computed as ω1 ∧
... ∧ ωk. Informally, it means that more trustworthy users are able to activate
simultaneously more roles from S.
Formally, TSSoD can be deﬁned as following.
Definition 3. TSSoD ∈ 2ROLES×TRW is a set of pairs (r, ω) where is a role,
ω is a trustworthiness, with the property that no user can be assigned to subset
of roles from TSSoD such that conjuction of opinions ωi of assigned roles will
exceed initial trustworthiness of that user. Formally, {(ri, ωi)|i = 1, 2, ..., k} ⊆
TSSoD ∧ ∀u ∈ auth user(ri |i = 1, ..., k ) ⇒ user trw(u)  ∧i=1,2,...,kωi
Formally, TDSoD can be deﬁned as following.
Definition 4. TDSoD ∈ 2ROLES×TRW is a collection of pairs (r, ω) where r
is a role, ω is a trustworthiness, with the property that no user can activate
a subset of roles from TDSoD such that conjunction of opinions ωi of roles
activated within a session will exceed initial trustworthiness of that activating
user. Formally: {(ri, ωi) |i = 1, 2, ..., k} ⊆ TDSoD ∧ s ∈ user sessions(u) ⇒
∀u ∈ auth user(s, ri |i = 1, ..., k ) ⇒ user trw(u)  ∧i=1,2,...,kωi
The reason of using conjunction operator is as following. Since opinion about
security implications (potential security threats) of activation role ri is ωi the
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opinion about security implications of activation simultaniosly a set of such roles
can be computed as a conjunction of coresponding opinions.
4.4 Delegation
Many authors have studied role delegation in RBAC [27, 26, 25]. In this work
we propose to control the ability to delegate roles by taking into considera-
tion trustworthiness of delegatee and trustworthiness constraints of delegated
role. The idea is that a user with high degree of trustworthiness can delegate
role with relatively high trustworthiness requirements to less trustful user (since
combination of role constraints and user trustworthiness can decrease required
trustworthiness and therefore make it available for less trustful user). Delegation
is not a part of standart RBAC and it may result in security violation. However
it may provide better usability.
Suppose that a user u wants to delegate her role r to another user u′ (that has
not this role assigned). One way to do this is to add the instance of r called r′ (r′
is a new instance of r which may diﬀers from r by trustworthiness constraints)
to u′ by adding r′ to the list of assigned roles assigned to u′. That is
assigned role(u′) = assigned role(u′) ∪ {r′, (ωlr′ , ωhr′)},
where the trustworthiness requirements (ωlr′ , ω
h
r′) on this delegated role r
′ will
be computed as combination of trustworthiness of u and constraints of r as
following (since it can be seen as a recommendation of r by u to u′) as following:
ωlr′ = ωu ⊗ ωlr
ωhr′ = ωu ⊗ ωhr
where ωu denotes trustworthiness of u. The use the recommendation operator
in this case because we consider delegation of role r by u to u′ as a recom-
mendation of u to the system to assign r to u′. The system uses trusworthiness
of u as trustworthiness of u’s recommendations and computes trustworthiness
constraints for r′ by taking into consideration of trustworthiness of u.
5 Conclusion
In this work we propose a novel trust-aware RBAC model (TA-RBAC). Our
approach integrates trustworthiness levels expressed as opinions in subjective
logic with traditional RBAC model. We have deﬁned trust-aware role inheri-
tance which is essential for deﬁning Hierarchical trust-aware RBAC. By using
subjective logic operations for combining independent opinions we deﬁne static
and dynamic trust-aware SoD. We use recommendation operator to deﬁne trust-
aware role delegation.
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